




Australian Government  
Department of Agriculture,  
Water and the Environment

# Final risk analysis report for the release of *Venturia paralias* for the biological control of *Euphorbia paralias*

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November 2020



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
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Map 1 Map of Australia



Map 2 A guide to Australia's bio-climatic zones



## Acronyms and abbreviations

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<b>Term or abbreviation</b>	<b>Definition</b>
ACT	Australian Capital Territory
ALOP	Appropriate level of protection
BA	Biosecurity Advice
BCA	Biological Control Agent
BICON	The Australian Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment Biosecurity Import Conditions database
BIRA	Biosecurity Import Risk Analysis
CSIRO	Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IPC	International Phytosanitary Certificate
IPPC	International Plant Protection Convention
ISPM	International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures
NSW	New South Wales
NPPO	National Plant Protection Organisation
NT	Northern Territory
PRA	Pest risk assessment
Qld	Queensland
SA	South Australia
SPS Agreement	WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Tas.	Tasmania
the department	The Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment
Vic.	Victoria
WA	Western Australia
WTO	World Trade Organization

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## Summary

The Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment has prepared this final report to assess the proposal by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) to release the fungus *Venturia paralias* for the biological control of the weed *Euphorbia paralias* (sea spurge) in Australia.

This final report recommends that the release of *V. paralias* should be permitted, subject to standard quarantine conditions associated with the import and release of exotic biological control agents.

This final report has determined the overall risk associated with the release of *V. paralias* to be Negligible. A risk estimate of Negligible achieves Australia's appropriate level of protection (ALOP).

The assessment of risk to off-target plants included consideration of the testing methodology used and the plant species test list, including non-target species tested in described experiments. The biology of *V. paralias* was also considered.

*Venturia paralias* has been satisfactorily demonstrated to be highly host specific to *E. paralias*. A limited infection was observed on two of ten *Euphorbia segetalis* plants tested, and this did not result in plant death. *Euphorbia segetalis* is a naturalised environmental weed in Australia. The agent was unable to successfully complete its lifecycle on any other non-target plants tested.

This final report also contains details of the risk assessment process used for consideration of potential off-target effects associated with the proposed release of *V. paralias*.

A written submission was received from one stakeholder during the consultation period for the draft report.

The application from CSIRO that was provided to the department has been included with this final report (Attachment 1).

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Australia's biosecurity policy framework

Australia's biosecurity policies aim to protect Australia against the risks that may arise from exotic pests entering, establishing and spreading in Australia, thereby threatening Australia's unique flora and fauna, as well as those agricultural industries that are relatively free from serious pests.

The risk analysis process is an important part of Australia's biosecurity policies. It enables the Australian Government to formally consider the level of biosecurity risk that may be associated with proposals to import goods or biological materials into Australia. If the biosecurity risks do not achieve the appropriate level of protection (ALOP) for Australia, risk management measures are proposed to reduce the risks to an acceptable level. If the risks cannot be reduced to an acceptable level, the goods or biological materials will not be imported into Australia until suitable measures are identified.

Successive Australian Governments have maintained a stringent, but not a zero risk, approach to the management of biosecurity risks. This approach is expressed in terms of the ALOP for Australia, which is defined in the *Biosecurity Act 2015* as providing a high level of protection aimed at reducing risk to a very low level, but not to zero.

Australia's risk analyses are undertaken by the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment using technical and scientific experts in relevant fields, and involve consultation with stakeholders at various stages during the process.

Further information about Australia's biosecurity framework is provided in the *Biosecurity Import Risk Analysis Guidelines 2016* located on the [Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment website](#).

## 1.2 This risk analysis

### 1.2.1 Background

An application was submitted by CSIRO to release a biological control agent (Attachment 1). The identified biological control agent, *Venturia paralias* is a fungus proposed for the biological control of sea spurge (*Euphorbia paralias*). The applicant has followed the steps outlined in the [Biosecurity Guidelines](#) for the Introduction of Exotic Biological Control Agents for the Control of Weeds and Plant Pests.

Sea spurge (*E. paralias*) is a fleshy herb, capable of producing large quantities of seeds and is native to northern Africa, southern Europe, western Asia and the Caucasus. It grows in coastal dune ecosystems. In Australia, *E. paralias* is invasive along the southern Australian coastline causing environmental impacts and losses in coastal ecosystems in Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria, Tasmania and New South Wales. Damage and impacts caused include preventing inland movement of sand, altering dune structure, threatening and displacing native flora, disturbing nesting sites of various bird species and affecting aboriginal heritage sites. The sap of sea spurge is also an irritant to humans and animals, deterring access to beaches. The

main control methods are physical removal and herbicide application, both of which are labour intensive (Attachment 1).

*Venturia paralias* is a fungus (Venturiales: Venturiaceae) causing leaf and stem lesions on sea spurge plants, leading to girdling of the stem and collapse of the plant. It is native to France, and as its synonyms (Attachment 1) is also found in Asia, the Caucasus and Europe.

*Venturia paralias* (formerly *Passalora euphorbiae*) has undergone a formal name change since the preliminary draft report and application were distributed to Plant Health Committee for comment. It is noted that phylogenetic analysis indicated that this species should be accommodated in the *Venturia* genus and not the *Passalora* genus (for more detail refer to Section 2.1 Agent name in Attachment 1). The applicants submitted a paper for publication in the scientific journal *Persoonia* (Volume 44, 2020), which has now been published (see Attachment 1 for details), detailing the formal description of the fungus as a new species of the genus *Venturia*, namely, *Venturia paralias*.

The isolate of *V. paralias* used in host-specificity testing was derived from an accession collected from sea spurge plants along the Atlantic coast of France. The material proposed for release will be the same isolate used for Australian host specificity testing (isolate LA2), which is genetically identical to the isolate used for testing in France (IMI 398982) (Attachment 1).

### 1.2.2 Scope

The scope of this risk analysis is to consider the biosecurity risk that may be associated with the release of an exotic biological control agent into the Australian environment (excluding its external territories). The primary risk associated with a release of this nature is the possibility of unwanted off-target effects on other species already present in Australia. The Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment assesses the risk under the *Biosecurity Act 2015*.

Plants that are considered weeds are sometimes also considered to have value, for example, for purposes such as ornamental display, traditional medicine, feed for stock, etc. Considerations of the benefits, and therefore any associated concerns about eradication, of the target weed species are out of the scope of this analysis.

The Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment will not commence an assessment to release a biological control agent unless the target has been approved by an appropriate government body. *Euphorbia paralias* was approved as a target for biological control by the Australian Weeds Committee on 31 August 2010.

### 1.2.3 Associated pests

There are pests that may arrive with an imported exotic biological control agent. Section 9 of the *Biosecurity Act 2015* defines a pest as ‘a species, strain or biotype of plant or animal, or a disease agent, that has the potential to cause, either directly or indirectly, harm to: human, animal or plant health; or the environment.’ These pests may include, for example, parasitoids, mites or fungi. Should an application to release a biological control agent be approved, these pests will be addressed by existing operational procedures that apply to the importation and final release of the agent. These procedures include detailed examination of imported material, confirmation of identity, and breeding under containment conditions before release. For this reason, associated pests are not further considered in this risk analysis.

#### 1.2.4 Consultation

In March 2020, a preliminary draft of this report was distributed to state and territory departments of primary industry via the Plant Health Committee. There were no objections to the proposed recommendation to release *V. paralias* for the biological control of the weed *E. paralias*.

On 6 August 2020, Biosecurity Advice 2020-P09 informed stakeholders of the release of a draft risk analysis report for the release of *V. paralias* for the biological control of the weed *E. paralias*. The draft report was released for a 30 day stakeholder consultation period that closed on 7 September 2020. One stakeholder submission was received (refer to Section 5 – Stakeholder responses to draft risk analysis report). No changes to the risk analysis were required as a result of the submission.

## 2 Assessment of off-target risks

This section sets out the assessment of off-target risks that could be associated with the release of the biological control agent. Where appropriate, the methods followed those used for pest risk analysis (PRA) by the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment in accordance with the International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs), including ISPM 2: *Framework for pest risk analysis* (FAO 2019a), ISPM 3: *Guidelines for the export, shipment, import and release of biological control agents and other beneficial organisms* (FAO 2017) and ISPM 11: *Pest risk analysis for quarantine pests* (FAO 2019c) that have been developed under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) (WTO 1995). The methodology for a commodity-based PRA is provided in Appendix A.

The SPS Agreement defines the concept of an ‘appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection (ALOP)’ as the level of protection deemed appropriate by the WTO Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory.

Like many other countries, Australia expresses its ALOP in qualitative terms. The ALOP for Australia, which reflects community expectations through government policy, is currently expressed as providing a high level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection aimed at reducing risk to a very low level, but not to zero. The band of cells in Table 2.1, marked ‘very low risk’, represents the upper boundary of the ALOP for Australia.

The risk associated with the release of a biological control agent is a combination of the estimates of likelihood of off-target effects and the potential consequences of any off-target effects. A risk estimation matrix (Table 2.1) is used to combine these estimates.

**Table 2.1 Risk estimation matrix.**

Likelihood of off-target effects	Consequences of off-target effects					
	Negligible	Very low	Low	Moderate	High	Extreme
High	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk	Moderate risk	High risk	Extreme risk
Moderate	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk	Moderate risk	High risk	Extreme risk
Low	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk	Moderate risk	High risk
Very low	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk	Moderate risk
Extremely low	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk
Negligible	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Very low risk

## 2.1 Stage 1: Initiation

Initiation commences when an applicant provides a submission proposing the release of a biological control agent. The Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment will not commence an assessment to release a biological control agent unless the target pest in the submission has been approved as a biological control target by an appropriate government body.

The risk analysis area is defined as all of Australia (excluding its external territories), given that once released there will be no control of spread of the agent other than environmental constraints related to the biology of the organism.

## 2.2 Stage 2: Risk assessment

This assessment evaluates the likelihood of off-target effects and the potential economic and environmental consequences of any such effects.

The risk assessment is based primarily on consideration of the information provided by the applicant in the application package, including the results of host specificity testing, and current information in the scientific literature, where this is available. Given that the proposal is for deliberate release, the likelihood of entry, establishment and spread is assumed to be certain, and therefore the assessment relates to the host specificity of the proposed agent.

A likelihood is assigned to the estimate of occurrence of off-target effects. Six descriptors are used: high; moderate; low; very low; extremely low; and negligible. Definitions for these descriptors and their indicative ranges are given in Appendix A, Table 1.

### 2.2.1 Host specificity testing methodology

The following information regarding host specificity testing has been sourced from the application provided by CSIRO (Attachment 1). For further details please refer to the application and its appendices.

In order to predict whether any non-target species would be at risk from the candidate agent, host specificity testing was conducted with *V. paralias* in France and under contained conditions in Australia. At the CSIRO European Laboratory, Montpellier, France, host specificity testing was carried out on 13 species across three subfamilies of the Euphorbiaceae family and the Phyllanthaceae family. A further 31 species were tested in Australia, including representatives from the Euphorbiaceae, Picrodendraceae and Phyllanthaceae families. In total, 44 non-target species were tested (Table 1, Attachment 1), nine of which were included in testing in both France and Australia to demonstrate consistency and confidence in results.

The host test list was developed using the framework of the centrifugal phylogenetic method, where an emphasis is placed on species most closely related to the target (Briese 2005; Wapshere 1974). Test species included a mix of native, introduced, naturalised, ornamental and weed species. *Euphorbia paralias* plants used in host specificity tests in Australia and France were grown from seeds collected from Woodmans Point, Coogee, Western Australia. An accession of *E. paralias* derived from seeds collected from Flinders Island, Tasmania was also

included in tests performed in France. Non-target plant species were obtained as seeds, cuttings or whole plants from a range of locations across Australia.

### **Host specificity tests**

As described in the application (Attachment 1), the isolates of *V. paralias* used in host-specificity testing (IMI 398982 and LA2 (ex. IMI 398982)) were derived from an accession collected from a diseased sea spurge plant on the Atlantic coast of France.

The methods used in experiments in France and Australia were similar, with isolate IMI 398982 used for experiments in France and LA2 (ex. IMI 398982) used for Australian experiments. The preference was to obtain two different host plant accessions for every non-target species. If this was not possible the single host accession was tested in two different tests, where plant numbers permitted. In general, for each plant species included in an experiment, a minimum of four replicates were used and several leaves were marked on each plant for microscopic examination later in the experiment.

Plants were sprayed to run off with conidial suspension and transferred into large plastic containers that had their surfaces misted with water. The containers were sealed to create a humid environment optimal for conidial germination and initiation of the infection process. The containers with inoculated plants were held in a controlled environment room for 48 hours at 20°C. After this time the test plants were transferred from the containers and arranged on a bench in a randomised design in the same room, where they were maintained at 20°C with 12 hour fluorescent light/dark cycles. Inoculated plants were maintained for 30 days before being assessed for disease symptoms.

Assessment of non-target plant species took the form of both microscopic examination and assessment of visible symptoms. Microscopic examination of leaves of non-target species was carried out to evaluate the development of *V. paralias*. In France, microscopic examination of five leaves from five tested plants per test species was carried out one month after inoculation. In Australia, several leaves from across the replicates for each test plant species were examined at 2, 7 and 12 days after inoculation. Several inoculated leaves from the sea spurge control plants were also microscopically examined during each test performed in Australia. In Australian experiments, a maximum of 100 conidia were counted on leaves of control and non-target test species and signs of germination, appressoria development, penetration and colonisation of leaf tissue were recorded. In France, only qualitative assessments of *V. paralias* development were made during microscopic examinations.

Assessment of visible symptoms of disease on non-target test plants and sea spurge control plants took place at the end of each host specificity experiment in France and Australia. Disease symptoms were assessed using a rating scale (Table 2, Attachment 1) and an average disease severity rating was recorded for control and non-target test plants. The microscopic development of *V. paralias* on control and non-target species was assessed using 17 fungus development categories and the overall responses of each plant species were recorded as either Immune (I), Resistant (R), Susceptible (S) or Highly Susceptible (HS).

An experiment was also conducted to determine the susceptibility to *V. paralias* of five Australian sea spurge accessions sourced from WA, Victoria and NSW, and additional to the accession used in host specificity testing.

### 2.2.2 Host specificity testing results

In the host specificity experiments undertaken in France and Australia, all *E. paralias* plants became infected, with leaf and stem lesions causing significant damage to the plants. The plant response was categorised as 'highly susceptible' using the plant response categories outlined in Table 2, Attachment 1.

In one experiment, two of ten *Euphorbia segetalis* plants showed visible symptoms of infection by *V. paralias*. The symptoms consisted of very small, restricted lesions on eight leaves. Conidiophores and conidia of *V. paralias* developed from two of these lesions. The plant response was classified as 'susceptible'. No visible symptoms of *V. paralias* infection were observed on any other non-target species tested. Various types of necrotic symptoms, atypical of infection caused by *V. paralias* were observed on leaves of several non-target species, however further examination via growth in moisture chambers confirmed that none of the symptoms were caused by *V. paralias*.

Microscopic examination of *E. paralias* leaves carried out during the host specificity testing revealed several developmental stages of infection, resulting in development of conidiophores of *V. paralias* from mature stromata and the production of abundant conidia when infected leaves were placed in moisture chambers. Microscopic examination of infected *E. segetalis* plants also revealed that *V. paralias* was able to progress through the developmental stages required to produce conidia. The infection was, however, only observed on a few leaves on two plants and was restricted – the fungus did not produce a large expanded network of subcuticular hyphae as observed on *E. paralias*, but rather was localised with little expansion from the point of entry.

Of the remaining non-target plants tested in France and Australia it was observed via microscopic examination that while *V. paralias* was able to germinate and form appressoria on many non-target species, penetration of the leaves only occurred on three additional non-target species. Three germinated conidia of *V. paralias* penetrated the leaves of *E. myrsinites*, two of which formed normal amoeboid primary hyphae and another of which formed a small, abnormal amoeboid primary hyphae. One germinated conidium penetrated and produced a small, abnormal amoeboid primary hyphae on *Mercurialis annua* and *E. helioscopia*. These three non-target species were categorised as 'resistant' to *V. paralias*.

All the remaining 40 non-target plant species tested were categorised as 'immune' to *V. paralias*, as there was no observed fungal penetration or subcuticular development.

The experiment to determine susceptibility of Australian accessions of *E. paralias* resulted in all five accessions being categorised as 'highly susceptible'. All inoculated plants were either dead or dying by the end of the experiment, with plants developing significant stem lesions and consequent collapse and drooping of stems.

### 2.2.3 Comments on host specificity testing

Host specificity testing in Australia and France used 44 non-target plant species. Forty one plant species were members of the family Euphorbiaceae, to which *E. paralias* belongs. Two plant species were from the family Phyllanthaceae and one plant species was from the family Picrodendraceae – both closely related families to Euphorbiaceae. Representative non-target plant species were tested from the three subfamilies within the family Euphorbiaceae. The genus

Euphorbia is split into four subgenera, *Athymalus* (Clade A), *Esula* (Clade B), *Euphorbia* (Clade C) and *Chamaesyce* (Clade D). Non-target plant species from each clade were included in host specificity testing. Within the subgenus *Esula*, in which *E. paralias* is taxonomically located, there are no species native to Australia (Riina et al. 2013); 16 non-target species were tested from this subgenus. The most closely related species present in Australia to *E. paralias* is *E. segetalis*, which is naturalised and a weed. The host test list includes the most closely related plant taxa to the target species in Australia. By testing these closely related non-target plant species, using the methodology outlined above and in the application, the applicant is considered to have satisfactorily assessed the likelihood of off-target effects occurring in the Australian environment.

*Euphorbia paralias* was the only plant taxon to be rated as 'highly susceptible' throughout the series of host specificity tests, suggesting a high degree of host specificity in *V. paralias*.

As the most closely phylogenetically related plant species to the target species in Australia, it is not unanticipated that *E. segetalis* was able to support limited infection by *V. paralias*. It is noted however that although disease symptoms were observed on *E. segetalis*, these symptoms were very limited, did not occur on all plants tested, and did not result in plant death, unlike the disease symptoms observed on *E. paralias*.

One accession of each of *E. myrsinites*, *E. helioscopia* and *M. annua* were rated as 'resistant' during host specificity testing. No visible symptoms occurred and *V. paralias* was unable to complete its lifecycle on these species. All other plant taxa tested were rated as 'immune' to *V. paralias*.

#### 2.2.4 Likelihood of off-target effects

The likelihood of off-target effects is estimated on the basis of the outcomes of host specificity testing and other relevant information presented in the application (Attachment 1).

The only plant taxon to be rated as 'highly susceptible' was the target species, *E. paralias*. The closely related *E. segetalis* was rated as 'susceptible' and supported a limited infection by *V. paralias* on 2 of 10 plants tested, with no plant deaths recorded.

On the basis of the results of host specificity testing reported in this application, it is concluded that the likelihood of occurrence of off-target effects in Australia is **Low**.

#### 2.2.5 Assessment of potential consequences of off-target effects

The potential consequences of the off-target effects of this biological control agent have been assessed using the same methodology (Appendix A) as used in the import risk analysis process for pests associated with imported fresh produce.

Criterion	Estimate and rationale
<b>Direct</b>	
Plant life or health	A—indiscernible It is anticipated that <i>V. paralias</i> will be a highly specific biological control agent as it was the only plant species categorised as 'highly susceptible' during host specificity testing. <i>Euphorbia segetalis</i> was categorised as 'susceptible' to <i>V. paralias</i> infection, however plants displaying visible symptoms only had a limited

	infection and no plant deaths occurred. <i>Euphorbia segetalis</i> is recorded as an environmental weed in Australia. Therefore, no direct off-target effects on plant life or health of economic or environmental importance are expected to occur.
Other aspects of the environment	A—indiscernible There is no evidence that the introduction of <i>V. paralias</i> would have any negative effects on any other aspects of the environment.
<b>Indirect</b>	
Eradication, control	A—indiscernible <i>Venturia paralias</i> is considered to be host specific to <i>E. paralias</i> , a weed of environmental importance. As there are no predicted off-target impacts of economic or environmental significance it would be very unlikely to meet the criterion for eradication. Therefore, the need for eradication and/or control is not anticipated.
Domestic trade	A—indiscernible <i>Venturia paralias</i> is considered to be host specific to <i>E. paralias</i> , a weed of environmental importance. Therefore <i>V. paralias</i> is considered unlikely to impact on any other plant species to the extent that domestic trade would be affected.
International trade	A—indiscernible <i>Euphorbia paralias</i> has no known economic benefit and no known trade value, either in its native range or other areas where it is now established. <i>Venturia paralias</i> is considered to be host specific to <i>E. paralias</i> , a weed of environmental importance. No off-target impacts are expected to occur on any plants of significance to international trade.
Environmental and non-commercial	A—indiscernible <i>Euphorbia paralias</i> is an introduced environmental weed in Australia. The reduction of this species in the environment is not anticipated to have any negative indirect environmental or non-commercial effects.

Based on this assessment the potential consequences of off-target effects are assessed as: **Negligible**.

### 2.2.6 Off-target risk estimate

Unrestricted risk is the result of combining the likelihood of off-target effects with the outcome of potential consequences. Off-target effects and consequences are combined using the risk estimation matrix shown in Table 2.1.

<b>Risk estimate for <i>Venturia paralias</i></b>	
Likelihood of off-target effects	Low
Consequences	Negligible
Risk	Negligible

As indicated, the risk estimate for release of *Venturia paralias* has been assessed as 'Negligible', which achieves the appropriate level of protection (ALOP) for Australia.

### 3 Recommendation on release

The overall risk estimate for release of *Venturia paralias* has been assessed as Negligible, which achieves the ALOP for Australia. Therefore, it is recommended that this biological control agent be permitted to be released, subject to standard import and release conditions to ensure that the released material is free of other organisms.

This recommendation is made on the basis of the high level of host specificity demonstrated by *Venturia paralias* on *Euphorbia paralias*, and is based on currently available information.

### 4 Attachment 1

**Attachment 1** - Information package to support application to release the fungus *Venturia paralias* for the biological control of sea spurge (*Euphorbia paralias*) in Australia.

## 5 Stakeholder responses to draft risk analysis report

This section summarises key stakeholder comments raised in consultation on the draft report, and the department's responses. One submission was received, from Andrew Cox (Invasive Species Council), during the consultation period for the draft risk analysis report.

**Issue 1: The Invasive Species Council previously submitted comments supporting the risk assessment. We now wish to make further comments. The argument that the risk is negligible is based on testing the family Euphorbiaceae and related families largely using exotic species. Only seven native species were tested. This means that there is some uncertainty about the effect of the agent (*V. paralias*) on native plants species that are likely to be at risk based on relatedness. While it is clear that there were serious attempts to source and propagate additional native species from untested related 'tribes', this limited testing of native species should receive greater prominence in the literature and summary. This risk process would be improved if the uncertainty is more clearly acknowledged and explained. Scientific knowledge is rarely complete and the consequential tradeoffs and risks from this uncertainty need to be openly discussed and considered. Despite these comments, our overall view remains unchanged: the risk associated with the release of *V. paralias* is likely to be negligible. We congratulate the CSIRO for the overall quality of this risk assessment and the level of detail provided.**

It would not have been possible to test every plant (native or other) in the Euphorbiaceae family and closely related families when conducting host specificity testing. Therefore, the applicant compiled a test list, based on widely accepted scientific principles (Briese, 2005; Wapshere 1974) in order to be confident that the biological control agent is host specific to the target weed. By testing a sufficient number of closely related plant species to the target, enough information is gathered to be able to assess the potential for off-target effects and their consequences. When conducting a risk analysis, DAWE's approach to the management of biosecurity risks is expressed in terms of the Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP) for Australia, which is defined in the Biosecurity Act 2015 as providing a high level of protection aimed at reducing risk to a very low level, but not to zero. The qualitative risk analysis process used by DAWE is based on International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs). It is acknowledged that there will always be a degree of uncertainty when assessing risk, however the likelihood of off-target effects, consequences and overall risk estimate is based on comprehensive host specificity testing and current information available in scientific literature.

In addition, the applicant has provided the following information in response to this comment;

In developing the host-test list use was made of the centrifugal phylogenetic method where more species closer to the plant target (*Euphorbia paralias* in this case) are included for testing. As the phylogenetic distance increases the further you move away from the target less species are required as the likelihood that the candidate biocontrol agent would parasitize and evolutionarily distantly related plant species becomes less. The goal therefore is to obtain a list of species that are a good representation of the breadth of phylogenetic diversity present in the target genus, family etc. and that is realistic in terms of material that can be sourced for host-testing. In our case, *Euphorbia paralias* is accommodated in *Euphorbia* subgenus *Esula* within Section *Paralias*.

Phylogenetically, this subgenus is basal in *Euphorbia* and quite distant from *Euphorbia* subgenus *Chamaesyce*, section *Anisiophyllum* and subsection *Chamaesyce*, where the majority of native Australian *Euphorbia* are accommodated. During our host-specificity testing we were able to source and successfully test seven *Euphorbia* species from three sections within subgenus *Chamaesyce*. So although we were not able to test many native *Euphorbia* species we are confident that the species that we did test were a good phylogenetic representation of subgenus *Chamaesyce*, and indeed the *Euphorbia* genus as a whole, based on material that we were able to source and test.

**Issue 2: I also wish to raise concerns about the risk estimate table 2.1 on page 5 of the draft risk analysis report. It is unclear why the risks on the first row, where the 'likelihood of off-target effects' is rated 'high', are the same as when the 'likelihood of off-target effects' is rated 'medium'. If the likelihood of effects is higher, then the risk should correspondingly be higher. The text that describes the asymmetry of the risk table does not appear to justify this rating. Is there a justification for this type of risk rating system?**

As noted in your submission, the text supporting the risk estimation matrix (REM) notes it is not symmetrical. The REM is biased towards higher consequence pests and therefore requires more stringent likelihood ratings (i.e. lower) to ensure Australia's appropriate level of protection (ALOP) is achieved. Similarly, lower consequence events present an increasingly lower risk.

The REM is consistent with risk management principles where a risk matrix can be symmetrical or asymmetrical (e.g. ISO 31010), and in the case of the REM, it is biased towards higher consequence pests that are considered to present a higher risk to Australia.

The department's risk assessment method, including the REM, is widely used in biosecurity risk assessment activity in Australia. The REM has been used by the department since 2001 and was endorsed at the Primary Industry Ministerial Council on 2 May 2002. It is used by Plant Health Australia and affiliated industries in assessing risk within their Industry Biosecurity Plans and has also been used by Australian states for assessing the risk of pests potentially associated with movement of domestic commodities.

## Appendix A: Method for pest risk analysis

This chapter sets out the method used for the pest risk analysis (PRA) in this report. The Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment has conducted this PRA in accordance with the International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs), including ISPM 2: *Framework for pest risk analysis* (FAO, 2019a) and ISPM 11: *Pest risk analysis for quarantine pests* (FAO, 2019c) that have been developed under the SPS Agreement (WTO, 1995).

A PRA is ‘the process of evaluating biological or other scientific and economic evidence to determine whether an organism is a pest, whether it should be regulated, and the strength of any phytosanitary measures to be taken against it’ (FAO, 2019b). A pest is ‘any species, strain or biotype of plant, animal, or pathogenic agent injurious to plants or plant products’ (FAO, 2019b). This definition is also applied in the *Biosecurity Act 2015*.

Biosecurity risk consists of two major components: the likelihood of a pest entering, establishing and spreading in Australia from imports; and the consequences should this happen. These two components are combined to give an overall estimate of the risk.

Unrestricted risk is estimated taking into account the existing commercial production practices of the exporting country and that, on arrival in Australia, the department will verify that the consignment received is as described on the commercial documents and its integrity has been maintained.

Restricted risk is estimated with phytosanitary measure(s) applied. A phytosanitary measure is ‘any legislation, regulation or official procedure having the purpose to prevent the introduction and/or spread of quarantine pests, or to limit the economic impact of regulated non-quarantine pests’ (FAO, 2019b).

A glossary of the terms used in the risk analysis is provided at the end of this report.

The PRAs are conducted in the following three consecutive stages: initiation, pest risk assessment and pest risk management.

### Stage 1 Initiation

Initiation identifies the pest(s) and pathway(s) that are of quarantine concern and should be considered for risk analysis in relation to the identified PRA area.

For this risk analysis, the ‘PRA area’ is defined as Australia for pests that are absent, or of limited distribution and under official control. For areas with regional freedom from a pest, the ‘PRA area’ may be defined on the basis of a state or territory of Australia or may be defined as a region of Australia consisting of parts of a state or territory or several states or territories.

For pests that had been considered by the department in other risk assessments and for which import conditions already exist, this risk analysis considered the likelihood of entry of pests on the commodity and whether existing policy is adequate to manage the risks associated with its import. Where appropriate, the previous risk assessment was taken into consideration in this risk analysis.

## Stage 2 Pest risk assessment

A pest risk assessment (for quarantine pests) is the 'evaluation of the probability of the introduction and spread of a pest and of the magnitude of the associated potential economic consequences' (FAO, 2019b).

The following three, consecutive steps were used in pest risk assessment:

### **Pest categorisation**

Pest categorisation identifies which of the pests with the potential to be on the commodity are quarantine pests for Australia and require pest risk assessment. A 'quarantine pest' is a pest of potential economic importance to the area endangered thereby and not yet present there, or present but not widely distributed and being officially controlled (FAO, 2019b).

The pests identified in Stage 1 were categorised using the following primary elements to identify the quarantine pests for the commodity being assessed:

- identity of the pest
- presence or absence in the PRA area
- regulatory status
- potential for establishment and spread in the PRA area
- potential for economic consequences (including environmental consequences) in the PRA area.

### **Assessment of the probability of entry, establishment and spread**

Details of how to assess the 'probability of entry', 'probability of establishment' and 'probability of spread' of a pest are given in ISPM 11 (FAO, 2019c). The SPS Agreement (WTO 1995) uses the term 'likelihood' rather than 'probability' for these estimates. In qualitative PRAs, the department uses the term 'likelihood' for the descriptors it uses for its estimates of likelihood of entry, establishment and spread. The use of the term 'probability' is limited to the direct quotation of ISPM definitions.

A summary of this process is given here, followed by a description of the qualitative methodology used in this risk analysis.

### ***Likelihood of entry***

The likelihood of entry describes the likelihood that a quarantine pest will enter Australia as a result of trade in a given commodity, be distributed in a viable state in the PRA area and subsequently be transferred to a host. It is based on pathway scenarios depicting necessary steps in the sourcing of the commodity for export, its processing, transport and storage, its use in Australia and the generation and disposal of waste. In particular, the ability of the pest to survive is considered for each of these various stages.

The likelihood of entry estimates for the quarantine pests for a commodity are based on the use of the existing commercial production, packaging and shipping practices of the exporting country. Details of the existing commercial production practices for the commodity are set out in

the report. These practices are taken into consideration by the department when estimating the likelihood of entry.

For the purpose of considering the likelihood of entry, the department divides this step into two components:

- **Likelihood of importation**—the likelihood that a pest will arrive in Australia when a given commodity is imported.
- **Likelihood of distribution**— the likelihood that the pest will be distributed, as a result of the processing, sale or disposal of the commodity, in the PRA area and subsequently transfer to a susceptible part of a host.

Factors to be considered in the likelihood of importation may include:

- distribution and incidence of the pest in the source area
- occurrence of the pest in a life-stage that would be associated with the commodity
- mode of trade (for example, bulk, packed)
- volume and frequency of movement of the commodity along each pathway
- seasonal timing of imports
- pest management, cultural and commercial procedures applied at the place of origin
- speed of transport and conditions of storage compared with the duration of the lifecycle of the pest
- vulnerability of the life-stages of the pest during transport or storage
- incidence of the pest likely to be associated with a consignment
- commercial procedures (for example, refrigeration) applied to consignments during transport and storage in the country of origin, and during transport to Australia.

Factors to be considered in the likelihood of distribution may include:

- commercial procedures (for example, refrigeration) applied to consignments during distribution in Australia
- dispersal mechanisms of the pest, including vectors, to allow movement from the pathway to a host
- whether the imported commodity is to be sent to a few or many destination points in the PRA area
- proximity of entry, transit and destination points to hosts
- time of year at which import takes place
- intended use of the commodity (for example, for planting, processing or consumption)
- risks from by-products and waste.

**Likelihood of establishment**

Establishment is defined as the ‘perpetuation for the foreseeable future, of a pest within an area after entry’ (FAO, 2019b). In order to estimate the likelihood of establishment of a pest, reliable biological information (for example, lifecycle, host range, epidemiology, survival) is obtained from the areas where the pest currently occurs. The situation in the PRA area can then be compared with that in the areas where it currently occurs and expert judgement used to assess the likelihood of establishment.

Factors to be considered in the likelihood of establishment in the PRA area may include:

- availability of hosts, alternative hosts and vectors
- suitability of the environment
- reproductive strategy and potential for adaptation
- minimum population needed for establishment
- cultural practices and control measures.

**Likelihood of spread**

Spread is defined as ‘the expansion of the geographical distribution of a pest within an area’ (FAO, 2019b). The likelihood of spread considers the factors relevant to the movement of the pest, after establishment on a host plant or plants, to other susceptible host plants of the same or different species in other areas. In order to estimate the likelihood of spread of the pest, reliable biological information is obtained from areas where the pest currently occurs. The situation in the PRA area is then carefully compared with that in the areas where the pest currently occurs and expert judgement used to assess the likelihood of spread.

Factors to be considered in the likelihood of spread may include:

- suitability of the natural and/or managed environment for natural spread of the pest
- presence of natural barriers
- potential for movement with commodities, conveyances or by vectors
- intended use of the commodity
- potential vectors of the pest in the PRA area
- potential natural enemies of the pest in the PRA area.

**Assigning likelihoods for entry, establishment and spread**

Likelihoods are assigned to each step of entry, establishment and spread. Six descriptors are used: high; moderate; low; very low; extremely low; and negligible (Table 1). Definitions for these descriptors and their indicative probability ranges are given in Table 1. The indicative probability ranges are only provided to illustrate the boundaries of the descriptors and are not used beyond this purpose in qualitative PRAs. These indicative probability ranges provide guidance to the risk analyst and promote consistency between different pest risk assessments.

**Table 1 Nomenclature of likelihoods**

<b>Likelihood</b>	<b>Descriptive definition</b>	<b>Indicative range</b>
High	The event would be very likely to occur	0.7 < to ≤ 1
Moderate	The event would occur with an even likelihood	0.3 < to ≤ 0.7
Low	The event would be unlikely to occur	0.05 < to ≤ 0.3
Very low	The event would be very unlikely to occur	0.001 < to ≤ 0.05
Extremely low	The event would be extremely unlikely to occur	0.000001 < to ≤ 0.001
Negligible	The event would almost certainly not occur	0 < to ≤ 0.000001

**Combining likelihoods**

The likelihood of entry is determined by combining the likelihood that the pest will be imported into the PRA area and the likelihood that the pest will be distributed within the PRA area, using a matrix of rules (Table 2). This matrix is then used to combine the likelihood of entry and the likelihood of establishment, and the likelihood of entry and establishment is then combined with the likelihood of spread to determine the overall likelihood of entry, establishment and spread.

For example, if the likelihood of importation is assigned a descriptor of 'low' and the likelihood of distribution is assigned a descriptor of 'moderate', then they are combined to give a likelihood of 'low' for entry. The likelihood for entry is then combined with the likelihood assigned for establishment of 'high' to give a likelihood for entry and establishment of 'low'. The likelihood for entry and establishment is then combined with the likelihood assigned for spread of 'very low' to give the overall likelihood for entry, establishment and spread of 'very low'. This can be summarised as:

importation x distribution = entry [E]

**low x moderate = low**

entry x establishment = [EE]

**low x high = low**

[EE] x spread = [EES]

**low x very low = very low**

**Table 2 Matrix of rules for combining likelihoods**

	High	Moderate	Low	Very low	Extremely low	Negligible
High	High	Moderate	Low	Very low	Extremely low	Negligible
Moderate		Low	Low	Very low	Extremely low	Negligible
Low			Very low	Very low	Extremely low	Negligible
Very low				Extremely low	Extremely low	Negligible
Extremely low					Negligible	Negligible
Negligible						Negligible

**Time and volume of trade**

One factor affecting the likelihood of entry is the volume and duration of trade. If all other conditions remain the same, the overall likelihood of entry will increase as time passes and the overall volume of trade increases.

The department normally considers the likelihood of entry on the basis of the estimated volume of one year's trade. This is a convenient value for the analysis that is relatively easy to estimate and allows for expert consideration of seasonal variations in pest presence, incidence and behaviour to be taken into account. The consideration of the likelihood of entry, establishment and spread and subsequent consequences takes into account events that might happen over a number of years even though only one year's volume of trade is being considered. This difference reflects biological and ecological facts, for example where a pest or disease may establish in the year of import but spread may take many years.

The use of a one year volume of trade has been taken into account when setting up the matrix that is used to estimate the risk and therefore any policy based on this analysis does not simply apply to one year of trade. Policy decisions that are based on the department's method that uses the estimated volume of one year's trade are consistent with Australia's policy on appropriate level of protection and meet the Australian Government's requirement for ongoing quarantine protection. If there are substantial changes in the volume and nature of the trade in specific commodities then the department will review the risk analysis and, if necessary, provide updated policy advice.

**Assessment of potential consequences**

The objective of the consequence assessment is to provide a structured and transparent analysis of the potential consequences if the pests or disease agents were to enter, establish and spread in Australia. The assessment considers direct and indirect pest effects and their economic and environmental consequences. The requirements for assessing potential consequences are given in Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement (WTO, 1995), ISPM 5 (FAO, 2019b) and ISPM 11 (FAO, 2019c).

Direct pest effects are considered in the context of the effects on:

- plant life or health

- other aspects of the environment.

Indirect pest effects are considered in the context of the effects on:

- eradication, control
- domestic trade
- international trade
- non-commercial and environmental.

For each of these six criteria, the consequences were estimated over four geographic levels, defined as:

**Local**—an aggregate of households or enterprises (a rural community, a town or a local government area).

**District**—a geographically or geopolitically associated collection of aggregates (generally a recognised section of a state or territory, such as ‘Far North Queensland’).

**Regional**—a geographically or geopolitically associated collection of districts in a geographic area (generally a state or territory, although there may be exceptions with larger states such as Western Australia).

**National**—Australia wide (Australian mainland states and territories and Tasmania).

For each criterion, the magnitude of the potential consequence at each of these levels was described using four categories, defined as:

**Indiscernible**—pest impact unlikely to be noticeable.

**Minor significance**—expected to lead to a minor increase in mortality/morbidity of hosts or a minor decrease in production but not expected to threaten the economic viability of production. Expected to decrease the value of non-commercial criteria but not threaten the criterion’s intrinsic value. Effects would generally be reversible.

**Significant**—expected to threaten the economic viability of production through a moderate increase in mortality/morbidity of hosts, or a moderate decrease in production. Expected to significantly diminish or threaten the intrinsic value of non-commercial criteria. Effects may not be reversible.

**Major significance**—expected to threaten the economic viability through a large increase in mortality/morbidity of hosts, or a large decrease in production. Expected to severely or irreversibly damage the intrinsic ‘value’ of non-commercial criteria.

The estimates of the magnitude of the potential consequences over the four geographic levels were translated into a qualitative impact score (A-G) using Table 3. For example, a consequence with a magnitude of ‘significant’ at the ‘district’ level will have a consequence impact score of D.

**Table 3 Decision rules for determining the consequence impact score based on the magnitude of consequences at four geographic scales**

Magnitude	Geographic scale			
	Local	District	Region	Nation
Indiscernible	A	A	A	A
Minor significance	B	C	D	E
Significant	C	D	E	F
Major significance	D	E	F	G

Note: In earlier qualitative PRAs, the scale for the impact scores went from A to F and did not explicitly allow for the rating 'indiscernible' at all four levels. This combination might be applicable for some criteria. In this report, the impact scale of A to F has been changed to become B-G and a new lowest category A ('indiscernible' at all four levels) was added. The rules for combining impacts in Table 4 were adjusted accordingly.

The overall consequence for each pest is achieved by combining the qualitative impact scores (A–G) for each direct and indirect consequence using a series of decision rules (Table 4). These rules are mutually exclusive, and are assessed in numerical order until one applies.

**Table 4 Decision rules for determining the overall consequence rating for each pest**

Rule	The impact scores for consequences of direct and indirect criteria	Overall consequence rating
1	Any criterion has an impact of 'G'; or more than one criterion has an impact of 'F'; or a single criterion has an impact of 'F' and each remaining criterion an 'E'.	Extreme
2	A single criterion has an impact of 'F'; or all criteria have an impact of 'E'.	High
3	One or more criteria have an impact of 'E'; or all criteria have an impact of 'D'.	Moderate
4	One or more criteria have an impact of 'D'; or all criteria have an impact of 'C'.	Low
5	One or more criteria have an impact of 'C'; or all criteria have an impact of 'B'.	Very Low
6	One or more but not all criteria have an impact of 'B', and all remaining criteria have an impact of 'A'.	Negligible

### Estimation of the unrestricted risk

Once the assessment of the likelihood of entry, establishment and spread and for potential consequences are completed, the unrestricted risk can be determined for each pest or groups of pests. This is determined by using a risk estimation matrix (Table 5) to combine the estimates of the likelihood of entry, establishment and spread and the overall consequences of pest establishment and spread. Therefore, risk is the combination of likelihood and consequence.

When interpreting the risk estimation matrix, note the descriptors for each axis are similar (for example, low, moderate, high) but the vertical axis refers to likelihood and the horizontal axis refers to consequences. Accordingly, a 'low' likelihood combined with 'high' consequences, is not the same as a 'high' likelihood combined with 'low' consequences—the matrix is not

symmetrical. For example, the former combination would give an unrestricted risk rating of 'moderate', whereas, the latter would be rated as a 'low' unrestricted risk.

**Table 5 Risk estimation matrix**

Likelihood of pest entry, establishment and spread	Consequences of pest entry, establishment and spread					
	Negligible	Very low	Low	Moderate	High	Extreme
High	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk	Moderate risk	High risk	Extreme risk
Moderate	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk	Moderate risk	High risk	Extreme risk
Low	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk	Moderate risk	High risk
Very low	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk	Moderate risk
Extremely low	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk
Negligible	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Very low risk

### The appropriate level of protection (ALOP) for Australia

The SPS Agreement defines the concept of an 'appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection (ALOP)' as the level of protection deemed appropriate by the WTO Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory.

Like many other countries, Australia expresses its ALOP in qualitative terms. The ALOP for Australia, which reflects community expectations through government policy, is currently expressed as providing a high level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection aimed at reducing risk to a very low level, but not to zero. The band of cells in Table 5 marked 'very low risk' represents the upper boundary of the ALOP for Australia.

### Stage 3 Pest risk management

Pest risk management describes the process of identifying and implementing phytosanitary measures to manage risks to achieve the ALOP for Australia, while ensuring that any negative effects on trade are minimised.

The conclusions from pest risk assessment are used to decide whether risk management is required and if so, the appropriate measures to be used. Where the unrestricted risk estimate does not achieve the ALOP for Australia, risk management measures are required to reduce this risk to a very low level. The guiding principle for risk management is to manage risk to achieve the ALOP for Australia. The effectiveness of any proposed phytosanitary measures (or combination of measures) is evaluated, using the same approach as used to evaluate the unrestricted risk, to ensure the restricted risk for the relevant pest or pests achieves the ALOP for Australia.

ISPM 11 (FAO, 2019c) provides details on the identification and selection of appropriate risk management options and notes that the choice of measures should be based on their effectiveness in reducing the likelihood of entry of the pest.

Examples given of measures commonly applied to traded commodities include:

- options for consignments—for example, inspection or testing for freedom from pests, prohibition of parts of the host, a pre-entry or post-entry quarantine system, specified conditions on preparation of the consignment, specified treatment of the consignment, restrictions on end-use, distribution and periods of entry of the commodity
- options preventing or reducing infestation in the crop—for example, treatment of the crop, restriction on the composition of a consignment so it is composed of plants belonging to resistant or less susceptible species, harvesting of plants at a certain age or specified time of the year, production in a certification scheme
- options ensuring that the area, place or site of production or crop is free from the pest—for example, pest-free area, pest-free place of production or pest-free production site
- options for other types of pathways—for example, consider natural spread, measures for human travellers and their baggage, cleaning or disinfestations of contaminated machinery
- options within the importing country—for example, surveillance and eradication programs
- prohibition of commodities—if no satisfactory measure can be found.

Risk management measures are identified for each quarantine pest where the level of biosecurity risk does not achieve the ALOP for Australia.

## Glossary

Term or abbreviation	Definition
Appropriate level of protection (ALOP)	The level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory (WTO 1995).
Appropriate level of protection (ALOP) for Australia	The <i>Biosecurity Act 2015</i> defines the appropriate level of protection (or ALOP) for Australia as a high level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection aimed at reducing biosecurity risks to very low, but not to zero.
Australian territory	Australian territory as referenced in the <i>Biosecurity Act 2015</i> refers to Australia, Christmas Island and Cocos (Keeling) Islands.
Biological control agent	A natural enemy, antagonist or competitor, or other organism, used for pest control (FAO 2019b).
Biosecurity	The prevention of the entry, establishment or spread of unwanted pests and infectious disease agents to protect human, animal or plant health or life, and the environment.
Biosecurity measures	The <i>Biosecurity Act 2015</i> defines biosecurity measures as measures to manage any of the following: biosecurity risk, the risk of contagion of a listed human disease, the risk of listed human diseases entering, emerging, establishing themselves or spreading in Australian territory, and biosecurity emergencies and human biosecurity emergencies.
Biosecurity import risk analysis (BIRA)	The <i>Biosecurity Act 2015</i> defines a BIRA as an evaluation of the level of biosecurity risk associated with particular goods, or a particular class of goods, that may be imported, or proposed to be imported, into Australian territory, including, if necessary, the identification of conditions that must be met to manage the level of biosecurity risk associated with the goods, or the class of goods, to a level that achieves the ALOP for Australia. The risk analysis process is regulated under legislation.
Biosecurity risk	The <i>Biosecurity Act 2015</i> refers to biosecurity risk as the likelihood of a disease or pest entering, establishing or spreading in Australian territory, and the potential for the disease or pest causing harm to human, animal or plant health, the environment, economic or community activities.
Control (of a pest)	Suppression, containment or eradication of a pest population (FAO 2019b).
The department	The Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment.
Endangered area	An area where ecological factors favour the establishment of a pest whose presence in the area will result in economically important loss (FAO 2019b).
Endemic	Belonging to, native to, or prevalent in a particular geography, area or environment.
Entry (of a pest)	Movement of a pest into an area where it is not yet present, or present but not widely distributed and being officially controlled (FAO 2019b).
Establishment (of a pest)	Perpetuation, for the foreseeable future, of a pest within an area after entry (FAO 2019b).
Fumigation	A method of pest control that completely fills an area with gaseous pesticides to suffocate or poison the pests within.
Genus	A taxonomic category ranking below a family and above a species and generally consisting of a group of species exhibiting similar characteristics. In taxonomic nomenclature the genus name is used, either alone or followed by a Latin adjective or epithet, to form the name of a species.
Host	An organism that harbours a parasite, mutual partner, or commensal partner, typically providing nourishment and shelter.

<b>Term or abbreviation</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Host range	Species capable, under natural conditions, of sustaining a specific pest or other organism (FAO, 2019b).
Infection	The internal 'endophytic' colonisation of a plant, or plant organ, and is generally associated with the development of disease symptoms as the integrity of cells and/or biological processes are disrupted.
Infestation (of a commodity)	Presence in a commodity of a living pest of the plant or plant product concerned. Infestation includes infection (FAO 2019b).
Inspection	Official visual examination of plants, plant products or other regulated articles to determine if pests are present or to determine compliance with phytosanitary regulations (FAO 2019b).
Interception (of a pest)	The detection of a pest during inspection or testing of an imported consignment (FAO 2019b).
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC)	The IPPC is an international plant health agreement, established in 1952, that aims to protect cultivated and wild plants by preventing the introduction and spread of pests. The IPPC provides an international framework for plant protection that includes developing International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs) for safeguarding plant resources.
International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM)	An international standard adopted by the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Interim Commission on Phytosanitary Measures or the Commission on Phytosanitary Measures, established under the IPPC (FAO 2019b).
Introduction (of a pest)	The entry of a pest resulting in its establishment (FAO 2019b).
Larva	A juvenile form of animal with indirect development, undergoing metamorphosis (for example, insects or amphibians).
National Plant Protection Organization (NPPO)	Official service established by a government to discharge the functions specified by the IPPC (FAO 2019b).
Non-regulated risk analysis	Refers to the process for conducting a risk analysis that is not regulated under legislation (Biosecurity import risk analysis guidelines 2016).
Nymph	The immature form of some insect species that undergoes incomplete metamorphosis. It is not to be confused with larva, as its overall form is already that of the adult.
Pathogen	A biological agent that can cause disease to its host.
Pathway	Any means that allows the entry or spread of a pest (FAO 2019b).
Pest	Any species, strain or biotype of plant, animal, or pathogenic agent injurious to plants or plant products (FAO 2019b).
Pest free area (PFA)	An area in which a specific pest does not occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained (FAO 2019b).
Pest risk analysis (PRA)	The process of evaluating biological or other scientific and economic evidence to determine whether an organism is a pest, whether it should be regulated, and the strength of any phytosanitary measures to be taken against it (FAO 2019b).
Pest risk assessment (for quarantine pests)	Evaluation of the probability of the introduction and spread of a pest and of the magnitude of the associated potential economic consequences (FAO 2019b).
Pest risk assessment (for regulated non-quarantine pests)	Evaluation of the probability that a pest in plants for planting affects the intended use of those plants with an economically unacceptable impact (FAO 2019b).
Pest risk management (for quarantine pests)	Evaluation and selection of options to reduce the risk of introduction and spread of a pest (FAO 2019b).
Pest risk management (for regulated non-quarantine pests)	Evaluation and selection of options to reduce the risk that a pest in plants for planting causes an economically unacceptable impact on the intended use of those plants (FAO 2019b).

<b>Term or abbreviation</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Pest status (in an area)	Presence or absence, at the present time, of a pest in an area, including where appropriate its distribution, as officially determined using expert judgement on the basis of current and historical pest records and other information (FAO 2019b).
Phytosanitary certificate	An official paper document or its official electronic equivalent, consistent with the model of certificates of the IPPC, attesting that a consignment meets phytosanitary import requirements (FAO 2019b).
Phytosanitary certification	Use of phytosanitary procedures leading to the issue of a phytosanitary certificate (FAO 2019b).
Phytosanitary measure	Phytosanitary relates to the health of plants. Any legislation, regulation or official procedure having the purpose to prevent the introduction and/or spread of quarantine pests, or to limit the economic impact of regulated non-quarantine pests (FAO 2019b). In this risk analysis the term 'phytosanitary measure' and 'risk management measure' may be used interchangeably.
Phytosanitary procedure	Any official method for implementing phytosanitary measures including the performance of inspections, tests, surveillance or treatments in connection with regulated pests (FAO 2019b).
Phytosanitary regulation	Official rule to prevent the introduction and/or spread of quarantine pests, or to limit the economic impact of regulated non-quarantine pests, including establishment of procedures for phytosanitary certification (FAO 2019b).
Polyphagous	Feeding on a relatively large number of hosts from different plant family and/or genera.
Practically free	Of a consignment, field or place of production, without pests (or a specific pests) in numbers or quantities in excess of those that can be expected to result from, and be consistent with good cultural and handling practices employed in the production and marketing of the commodity (FAO 2019b).
Pupa	An inactive life stage that only occurs in insects that undergo complete metamorphosis, for example butterflies and moths (Lepidoptera), beetles (Coleoptera) and bees, wasps and ants (Hymenoptera).
Quarantine	Official confinement of regulated articles for observation and research or for further inspection, testing or treatment (FAO 2019b).
Quarantine pest	A pest of potential economic importance to the area endangered thereby and not yet present there, or present but not widely distributed and being officially controlled (FAO 2019b).
Regulated article	Any plant, plant product, storage place, packaging, conveyance, container, soil and any other organism, object or material capable of harbouring or spreading pests, deemed to require phytosanitary measures, particularly where international transportation is involved (FAO 2019b).
Regulated non-quarantine pest	A non-quarantine pest whose presence in plants for planting affects the intended use of those plants with an economically unacceptable impact and which is therefore regulated within the territory of the importing contracting party (FAO 2019b).
Regulated pest	A quarantine pest or a regulated non-quarantine pest (FAO 2019b).
Restricted risk	Restricted risk is the risk estimate when risk management measures are applied.
Risk analysis	Refers to the technical or scientific process for assessing the level of biosecurity risk associated with the goods, or the class of goods, and if necessary, the identification of conditions that must be met to manage the level of biosecurity risk associated with the goods, or class of goods to a level that achieves the ALOP for Australia.
Risk management measure	Are conditions that must be met to manage the level of biosecurity risk associated with the goods or the class of goods, to a level that achieves the ALOP for Australia. In this risk analysis, the term 'risk management measure' and 'phytosanitary measure' may be used interchangeably.

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<b>Term or abbreviation</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Saprophyte	An organism deriving its nourishment from dead organic matter.
Spread (of a pest)	Expansion of the geographical distribution of a pest within an area (FAO 2019b).
SPS Agreement	WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
Stakeholders	Government agencies, individuals, community or industry groups or organizations, whether in Australia or overseas, including the proponent/applicant for a specific proposal, who have an interest in the policy issues.
Surveillance	An official process which collects and records data on pest occurrence or absence by surveying, monitoring or other procedures (FAO 2019b).
Systems approach(es)	The integration of different risk management measures, at least two of which act independently, and which cumulatively achieve the appropriate level of protection against regulated pests.
Treatment	Official procedure for the killing, inactivation or removal of pests, or for rendering pests infertile or for devitalisation (FAO 2019b).
Unrestricted risk	Unrestricted risk estimates apply in the absence of risk management measures.
Vector	An organism that does not cause disease itself, but which causes infection by conveying pathogens from one host to another.
Viable	Alive, able to germinate or capable of growth.

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